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Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

Both parties appealed the superior court ruling. The plaintiffs
challenged the court's finding that the defendants' property extended
to the high water mark. The defendants challenged the location of
the plaintiffs' deeded right-of-way.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld the superior court
ruling that the defendants' property extended to the high water mark.
Because the grantor worded the defendants' deed ambiguously, the
Court used extrinsic evidence to find the grantor's intent. The
defendants introduced, and the court accepted, a letter from the
grantor's attorney that stated that the grantor intended to convey
complete title extending to the shore. Further, the supreme court
rejected the plaintiffs' contention that they owned the land by
prescription by finding that the defendants permitted the plaintiffs to
use the beach; thus, the plaintiffs did not satisfy prescription's adverse
element.
Additionally, the supreme court overturned the superior court
ruling concerning the location of the plaintiffs deeded right-of-way.
The supreme court found that the ruling of the lower court
contradicted the deed's plain language because it created a right-ofway that bisected the defendants' properties. Both the defendants' and
the plaintiffs' deeds dictated that the right-of-way separated the
defendants' properties.
Madoline Wallace

OHIO
Long Beach Association, Inc. v. Jones, 697 N.E.2d 208 (Ohio 1998)
(holding that a plat for a block containing a lagoon did not create a
separate subdivision which would prevent owners of lots in other
blocks of the subdivision from using the lagoon).
In 1923, the Long Beach Company ("Company") submitted a plat
for subdivision. It included blocks A, B, and C. The Company
subdivided only blocks A and C into lots at this time. The Company
did not subdivide Block B, situated between blocks A and C, into lots
until the Company submitted a separate plat in 1927. The 1927 plat,
entitled "Long Beach Subdivision of Block B," stated that Lot E, which
included a lagoon and private lane, "[was] for the use of lot owners
within the subdivision." The appellants purchased lots in Block B and
contended that the language in the plat dedication supported the
claim that the lagoon was for the exclusive use of the residents of
Block B. The trial court dismissed all of the appellants' claims. Upon
appeal, the court of appeals held that the trial court erred in
dismissing the counterclaims of trespass, conversion, and unjust
enrichment, and affirmed summary judgment on the claim of
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intentional infliction of emotional distress. Additionally, the court of
appeals held that the trial court erred in its interpretation of the 1927
plat and found in favor of the appellants as to the meaning of the
language in the plat.
The Ohio Supreme Court held that the wording in the 1927 plat
was clear and unambiguous in stating that all residents of the Long
Beach subdivision had use of the lagoon, which included the residents
of Blocks A, B, and C. The court noted that where terms in an existing
contract are clear and unambiguous, the court could not in effect
create a new contract by finding an intent not expressed in the clear
language employed by the parties. Applying this principle, the court
concluded that if the drafters intended to delineate an entirely new
subdivision, they would have done so by eliminating any reference to it
as being a part of the general subdivision. Furthermore, the court
concluded that the language in the plat clearly established Block B as
part of the general subdivision. The court rejected the appellants'
argument that there was any language to indicate an intent to remove
Block B from the general subdivision, which would give exclusive use
of the lagoon to residents of Block B. Therefore, the use of the private
lane and the lagoon were not exclusive to the residents of Block B.
The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the court of appeal's decision
and reinstated the trial court's judgment.
Lori Asher

PENNSYLVANIA
Adams Sanitation Co. v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 715 A.2d 390
(Pa. 1998) (holding that the Department of Environmental Protection
is permitted to order an owner or occupier of land to remedy a
contaminated condition, regardless of fault or knowledge).
Adams Sanitation Company ("ACS") entered into a lease with
Netta S. Deatrick to operate a sanitary landfill on a 108 acre parcel
and, in 1979, obtained a permit from the Pennsylvania Department of
Environmental Protection ("DEP") allowing it to dispose of solid waste
on the site. In October of 1983, Keystone Sanitation Company
("Keystone") acquired ASC's assets, name, tradename, lease rights, and
obligations to Deatrick. In November, 1983, Keystone assigned its
rights and obligations under this lease to its new, wholly owned
subsidiary, known as Adams Sanitation Company, Inc. ("Subsidiary").
At that time, ASC had filled seventy-eight acres of the 108 acre parcel
of land. The Subsidiary applied and received a permit from DEP
allowing it to fill the remaining thirty acres. DEP notified the
Subsidiary that it was responsible for the water supply contamination
on a residential tract of land adjacent to the seventy-eight acre site

